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The Value of Cryptocurrencies: How 
Bitcoin Fares in the Pockets of Federal and 
State Courts 
Brandon M. Peck* 
A recent Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida decision has 
raised concerns over how both federal and state courts consider 
the unregulated cryptocurrency, Bitcoin. In State of Florida v. 
Michell Abner Espinoza, Judge Teresa Pooler held that Bitcoin 
did not fall under the statutory definitions of “payment 
instrument” or “monetary instrument” because virtual currency 
is not directly specified nor could it be included within one of the 
defined categories listed in Fla. Stat. § 560.103(29) or 
896.101(2). Furthermore, Judge Pooler, alluding to the doctrine 
of lenity, refused to hold Espinoza responsible under a statute that 
is “so vaguely written that even legal professionals have difficulty 
finding a singular meaning.”1 
Judge Pooler thus disagreed with earlier decisions by several 
federal judges. The federal courts have uniformly held that Bitcoin 
is “money” or “funds” for the purpose of money laundering. 
Additionally, the federal courts, analyzing the applicable federal 
money laundering statutes, have refused to apply the doctrine of 
lenity because there were no ambiguities such that “an ordinary 
person would [not] know that engaging in the challenged conduct 
could give rise to the type of criminal liability charged.”2 State 
and federal courts can interpret similar state and federal statutes 
in differing ways based on each statute’s respective canon of 
construction and legislative intent. However, because the Florida 
                                                                                                             
 *  Brandon Peck is a Juris Doctor candidate at the University of Miami School of Law, 
member of the University of Miami Business Law Review and graduate of Carnegie 
Mellon University, Tepper School of Business. 
1 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016). 
2 See United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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Money Laundering Act (Fla. Stat. § 896.101) is modeled on the 
federal Money Laundering Control Act (18 U.S.C. § 1956), it is 
reasonable to assume that the courts would reach the same 
conclusion. 
Part I of this comment describes Bitcoin, discussing the 
cryptocurrency’s origins as well as how it works. Part II analyzes 
both the state and federal anti–money laundering statutes in light 
of Florida v. Espinoza and the opinions of the federal courts. Part 
III discusses the state and federal business services statutes in 
light of Florida v. Espinoza and federal court decisions, including 
U.S. v. Ulbricht, which held Bitcoin to be within the plain meaning 
of “money” and “funds” under the applicable federal money 
laundering statute. 
Finally, Part IV of this paper addresses the public policy 
implications of how Bitcoin is interpreted under criminal statutes 
pertaining to money laundering. A brief synopsis will provide 
information on how other countries and states have considered 
Bitcoin and the steps that the U.S. Congress has begun to take to 
address Bitcoin in criminal prosecutions. 
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“Nobody knows what a dollar is, what the word means, what holds 
the thing up, [and] what it stands in for.”3 
 
A decision from the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida has 
disagreed with several federal court decisions regarding whether Bitcoin, 
and cryptocurrencies more generally, are “money” or “property.”4 The 
distinction has implications on whether Bitcoin, as well as other 
cryptocurrencies, is subject to current federal and state anti–money 
laundering and unlawful money services business statutes. If Bitcoin is 
considered “money,” and, therefore subject to current money laundering 
statutes, persons using Bitcoin while engaged in the acts of money 
laundering may be prosecuted pursuant to current state and federal 
statutes. However, if Bitcoin is considered “property,” persons using 
Bitcoin to launder money have not violated the applicable federal or state 
money laundering statutes according to the applicable statutory language. 
Proponents of characterizing Bitcoin as “money” argue that the 
cryptocurrency functions like money and, therefore, it should be treated 
like money. At times, Bitcoin is used to (1) purchase goods and services, 
(2) measure value, and (3) exchange for conventional legal tender or 
currencies.5 However, advocates who argue for Bitcoin to be considered 
property cite the cryptocurrency’s (1) decentralization, (2) volatility and 
instability in future value, and (3) acceptance only by a narrow selection 
of merchants.6 
                                                                                                             
3 Toby Lester, The Money Artist, THE ATLANTIC (July 1999), https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/07/the-money-artist/308425/. 
4 Compare Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016), with United States v. 
Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014), United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), and Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, No. 4:13–CV–416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 
2013). 
5 See generally Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 707; Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 545; Ulbricht, 
31 F. Supp. 3d at 548, 570; Shavers, WL 4028182, at *2. 
6 See Michelle Singletary, Investing in Bitcoin has a Dangerous Flip Side, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/investing-in-bitcoin-has-a-
dangerous-flip-side/2014/02/28/09af7f54-9e5e-11e3-9ba6-800d1192d08b_story.html?
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Money Laundering in the United States 
“Money laundering is the process of making illegally gained proceeds 
(i.e. ‘dirty money’) appear legal (i.e. ‘clean money’)” and is usually 
conducted in three stages: “placement, layering, and integration.”7 
“Placement” occurs when illegally gained proceeds are invested or 
“introduced into a legitimate financial system or business.”8 The illegally 
gained proceeds are then “layered” or mixed with legitimate money, which 
creates confusion regarding the whereabouts or origins of the illegally 
gained proceeds.9 Finally, “integration” refers to the illegally–gained 
proceeds becoming sufficiently intertwined with legitimate money such 
that it is safe to be withdrawn from the financial system and used for other 
purposes without being identified as illegitimate.10 Although there is 
evidence that the act of hiding money or assets from state confiscation has 
been ongoing for several thousand years,11 money laundering in the United 
States has been addressed as a response to the Prohibition in the 1930s, 
organized crime in the 1970s, and drug wars of the 1980s.12 
Congress has enacted modern anti–money laundering statutes 
throughout the course of the last century, primarily aiming to combat 
organized crime and drug trafficking. In 1970, Congress passed the Bank 
Secrecy Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 
(the “RICO Act”).13 The Bank Secrecy Act has become one of the most 
important tools in combatting money laundering as it “[e]stablished 
requirements for recordkeeping and reporting by [both] . . . individuals . . . 
and financial institutions” in order to aid in the identification of the 
                                                                                                             
utm_term=.3e608f904f76. In regards to volatility, the value of a bitcoin was “less than $14 
[fourteen dollars] in January 2013 and jumped to $1,200 [one thousand two hundred 
dollars] in November of 2013.” Id. 
7 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, History of Anti–Money Laundering Laws, 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-
money-laundering-laws (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
8 Id. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 See Nigel Morris–Cotterill, A Brief History of Money Laundering, MONEY 
LAUNDERING RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE, http://www.countermoneylaundering.
com/public/content/brief-history-money-laundering (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
12 See Roberto Saviano, Where the Mob Keeps its Money, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/opinion/sunday/where-the-mob-keeps-its-money.
html. 
13 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, supra note 7; Eliot Kaough, Methods 
Used to Combat Organized Crime and Racketeering: United States, United Kingdom, Italy 
and Canada, INFORMATION & KNOWLEDGE SERVICES, http://archive.mops.gov.il/
Documents/International_Public_Security_Briefs/Organized%20crime%20brief%2001.1
3.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
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“source, volume, and movement of currency.”14 The Act legally bound 
banks “to (1) report cash transaction over $10,000 [ten thousand dollars], 
(2) properly identify persons conducting [these] transactions, and (3) 
maintain a paper trail by keeping appropriate records . . . .”15 The RICO 
Act was primarily focused on prosecuting Mafia syndicates, but was 
expanded by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act in 1984 to address 
money laundering more appropriately.16 In 1986, Congress passed the 
Money Laundering Control Act, which officially designated money 
laundering as a federal crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (the “Federal 
Anti–Money Laundering Statute”).17 
The Origins of Bitcoin and Blockchain 
Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency and peer–to–peer payment system that was 
launched on January 3, 2009.18 Although Bitcoin was not the first 
cryptocurrency ever introduced19 and there indeed exists hundreds of other 
such electronic payment systems,20 Bitcoin is the world’s first completely 
decentralized digital currency that enabled transactions to occur between 
users directly without the intervention or regulation of any financial 
intermediaries, such as banks or credit card companies.21 The purpose of 
Bitcoin is to provide “a solution to the double–spending problem” and 
“achieve a level of privacy” within peer–to–peer online transactions 
without the need and additional costs of a trusted third party.22 
                                                                                                             
14 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, supra note 7. 
15 Id. 
16 Kaough, supra note 13. 
17 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, supra note 7. 
18 See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer–to–Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN 
(Oct. 31, 2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf; L.S., Who is Satoshi Nakamoto?, 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/
11/economist-explains-1. An anonymous programmer, or group of programmers, who used 
the alias of “Satoshi Nakamoto,” invented and developed Bitcoin. 
19 See Derek Khanna, Can Bitcoin Outrun the Regulators?, POLITIX (Mar. 28, 2014), 
http://www.rstreet.org/op-ed/can-bitcoin-outrun-the-regulators/. E–Gold and Liberty 
Dollar, other digital currencies, have essentially been shut down by the government. E–
Gold was backed by gold while Liberty Dollar was backed by silver. E–Gold was shut 
down following money laundering charges and Bernard Von Nothause, the creator of 
Liberty Dollar, was convicted in 2011 of making and possessing currency. 
20 See CryptoCurrency Market Capitalizations, COIN MKT. CAP, http://coinmarketcap.
com/all/views/all/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). As of March 19, 2017, one Bitcoin had a 
value of $1,069.91 USD. 
21 See Nakamoto, supra note 18; Jerry Brito & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin: A Primer for 
Policymakers, GEORGE MASON UNIV. MARCATUS CTR. (2013), at 1, https://www.mercatus.
org/system/files/Brito_BitcoinPrimer.pdf. 
22 Nakamoto, supra note 18, at 1–6. The “double–spending” problem is that the bitcoin 
payees cannot verify that the payor did not already spend the bitcoin in a previous 
transaction. A solution to this problem that Bitcoin was intended to forego is the 
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Bitcoin exists freely on the internet and is available for anyone to use 
across the globe.23 Bitcoin does not require personal user information, such 
as a credit card or bank account identification number, because Bitcoin 
transactions are conducted without the use of any government–supported 
fiat currency.24 Rather, Bitcoin transactions are conducted using a unit 
known as a “bitcoin.”25 Unlike traditional currency, bitcoin has no physical 
form and exists only electronically on the internet. However, like 
government–supported fiat currency, bitcoin is backed by individuals’ 
faith in the currency. Therefore, if users lose faith in Bitcoin, demand for 
bitcoins will decrease and bitcoins will no longer have value.26 
Instead of government or central authorities producing and 
introducing bitcoins into the marketplace, the only way that bitcoins are 
created is through a process known as “mining.”27 Conducted by 
individual Bitcoin–user computers and processors throughout the world, 
mining is the process of verifying, recording, and publishing recent 
Bitcoin transactions to a shared public distribution ledger called the 
“blockchain.”28 All Bitcoin transactions are published and made public on 
the blockchain ledger.29 New bitcoins are created and awarded to 
successful miners as a form of compensation for the use of the miner’s 
computer processing unit and the electricity expended during the process 
                                                                                                             
“introduc[tion] of a trusted central authority, or mint, that checks every transaction for 
double spending.” 
23 See Jason Leibowitz, Bitcoin: A 21st Century Currency Explained by a Wall Street 
Veteran, COINDESK (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-explained-global-
currency-wall-street-veteran/. 
24 See id. 
25 See Brito & Castillo, supra note 21. A unit of bitcoin is also referred to as a BTC; 
however, for simplicity purposes, I will use Bitcoin (capitalized) to refer to the 
cryptocurrency payment system itself, bitcoin (lowercased) as the unit of a transaction, and 
cryptocurrencies generally as all of the existing digital currencies. 
26 See Allison Caffarone & Meg Holzer, ‘Ev’ry American Experiment Sets a Precedent’: 
Why One Florida State Court’s Bitcoin Opinion is Everyone’s Business, 16 HOFSTRA L. J. 
OF INT’L BUS. & L. 6, 8 (2017) (pointing out that Bitcoins are a consumer faith–based 
system). 
27 See id. 
28 See Joshua Kopstein, The Mission to Decentralize the Internet, NEW YORKER (Dec. 
12, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-mission-to-decentralize-the-
internet. Bitcoin software users utilize their individual computer processors to check the 
validity of transactions, add such transactions to their individual copy of blockchain, and 
broadcast the additional transactions to other nodes all in order to ensure that no one uses 
the same bitcoins twice. Approximately six times per hour, a new group of accepted 
transactions, known as a “block,” is created, added to the blockchain, published to all other 
nodes, which are maintaining their own copies of the blockchain. 
29 See Caffarone & Holzer, supra note 26, at 8. 
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of recording and publishing Bitcoin transactions.30 Therefore, Bitcoin 
users who are engaged in the process of mining authenticate Bitcoin 
transactions and thus forego the need of any third–party institution or 
regulatory body to verify the individual transactions.31 
In order to spend his or her bitcoins, a user must first digitally sign the 
transaction by inputting a corresponding private key, which only the owner 
of the bitcoins is designed to know.32 Bitcoin maintains the privacy of 
transaction’s parties by limiting the information published to the 
blockchain ledger and keeping the public key ownership anonymous.33 
Similar to a public stock exchange, third–party Bitcoin users are aware 
that a Bitcoin user is sending bitcoins to another user, but only information 
regarding the time and amount of the transaction is published and made 
public.34 The identities of the payor and payee of a Bitcoin transaction are 
not made public on the blockchain ledger.35 Currently, about twelve 
million (12,000,000) bitcoins are in circulation.36 
Bitcoins can also be obtained through the exchange of other 
currencies, including the government–supported United States Dollar, 
Euro, and Chinese Yen, as well as other digital currencies; additionally, 
bitcoins may be procured through the sale of products and services.37 
These exchanges can be completed directly by purchasing the bitcoins 
from a bitcoin dealer or indirectly through a “bitcoin exchange,” which 
allows prospective Bitcoin buyers to purchase the bitcoins using 
traditional currency.38 More than one hundred thousand (100,000) 
merchants, including Microsoft and Paypal, now accept bitcoins as forms 
                                                                                                             
30 See Nakamoto, supra note 18 at 4; Kopstein, supra note 27. Miners keep the 
blockchain consistent, complete, and effectively unalterable by repeatedly verifying and 
collecting newly broadcast transactions into every new group of transactions called a block. 
Bitcoin was designed such that only twenty–one million (21,000,000) can be issued or 
“mined.” Until 2020, twelve and one half (12.5) bitcoins will be produced per block 
(approximately every ten minutes) and used as compensation to miners. Thereafter, the 
number of bitcoins will halve every 210,000 blocks (approximately every four years) until 
the limit is reached. 
31 See Caffarone & Holzer, supra note 26, at 8–9. 
32 Brito & Castillo, supra note 21, at 5. If the private key is lost, the Bitcoin network 
will not recognize or honor any other evidence of ownership; thus, rendering the bitcoins 
unusable and effectively lost. See also Man Throws Away 7,500 Bitcoins, Now Worth $7.5 
Million, CBS DC, http://washington.cbslocal.com/2013/11/29/man-throws-away-7500-
bitcoins-now-worth-7-5-million/. For a bitcoin transaction to be valid, every bitcoin input 
must be (1) an unspent output of a previous transaction and (2) digitally signed. 
33 See Nakamoto, supra note 18, at 6. 
34 Id. 
35 See Caffarone & Holzer, supra note 26, at 9. 
36 See Khanna, supra note 19, at 1. 
37 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, No. 4:13–CV–416, 2013 WL 4028182 at *2 (E.D. 
Tex. Aug. 6, 2013). 
38 Caffarone & Holzer, supra note 26, at 34, 37. 
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of payment.39 Although Bitcoin has been acknowledged in some online 
markets and retail spaces, it has received scrutiny and negative attention 
from legislative bodies, regulatory agencies, law enforcement, and the 
media due to its use by criminals.40 
The two most infamous incidents surrounding Bitcoin both occurred 
in 2013. The first involved Mt. Gox, a bitcoin exchange launched in 2010 
that at one time handled approximately seventy percent (70%) of all 
bitcoin transactions.41 Mt. Gox suspended trading, closed its website, and 
filed for bankruptcy before announcing that seven hundred and fifty 
thousand (750,000) bitcoins belonging to customers had gone missing and 
were likely stolen.42 The second incident involved an online black market 
platform, known as the “Silk Road,” which provided illegal drugs, child 
pornography, murder–for–hire services, and weapons for those that 
exchanged in bitcoins.43 The Silk Road was shut down by U.S. law 
enforcement and the founder of the online market, Ross William Ulbricht, 
was sentenced to life in prison.44 
                                                                                                             
39 See Anthony Cuthbertson, Bitcoin Now Accepted by 100,000 Merchants Worldwide, 
INT’L BUS. TIMES, (Feb. 4, 2015, 3:34 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bitcoin-now-
accepted-by-100000-merchants-worldwide-1486613. 
40 See Timothy B. Lee & Hayley Tsukayama, Bitcoin Industry Reeling as Authorities 
Shut Down Silk Road Online Marketplace, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bitcoin-industry-reeling-as-authorities-shut-down
-silk-road-online-marketplace/2013/10/02/961b105a-2ba1-11e3-97a3-ff2758228523_
story.html?utm_term=.e21eff6ec1b6; Timothy B. Lee, Here’s How Bitcoin Charmed 
Washington, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2013/11/21/heres-how-bitcoin-charmed-washington/?utm_term=.4751fd061
18e. 
41 See Paul Vigna, Five Things About Mt. Gox’s Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2014), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/02/25/5-things-about-mt-goxs-crisis. 
42 See Carter Dougherty & Grace Huang, Mt. Gox Seeks Bankruptcy After $480 Million 
Bitcoin Loss, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2014, 2:59 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-02-28/mt-gox-exchange-files-for-bankruptcy. The loss in Bitcoins 
were valued at more than four hundred and fifty million dollars ($450 million) at the time. 
43 See Nicolas Christin, Traveling the Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large 
Anonymous Online Marketplace, INT’L WORLD WIDE WEB CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, at 8, 
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/nicolasc/publications/Christin-WWW13.pdf. It is 
estimated that the Silk Road hosted between five (5) and nine (9) percent of all transactions 
on all exchanges in the world; almost all of which involving drugs. Buyers and sellers who 
utilized the Silk Road were required to conduct all transactions with bitcoins in order to 
provide a certain level of anonymity. 
44 See Judgment in a Criminal Case at 3, United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14–cr–00068–
KBF–1 (2014), https://www.docketalarm.com/cases/New_York_Southern_District_Court
/1--14-cr-00068/USA_v._Ulbricht/269/. 
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Bitcoin Precedence In Florida 
“Buying Bitcoins allows money to be anonymously moved around 
the world with a click of a computer mouse. Improperly used, Bitcoins 
are often seen as a perfect means of laundering dirty money or for 
buying and selling illegal goods, such as drugs or stolen credit card 
information.”45 
 
Until 2016, only federal courts had provided precedent regarding the 
analysis and scrutiny of Bitcoin under money laundering statutes.46 
However, following the arrest of two Miami residents, Pascal Reid and 
Michel Abner Espinoza, Florida has become the first state to prosecute 
Bitcoin users pursuant to state statutes.47 Law enforcement officers 
discovered that Reid and Espinoza were using a Bitcoin exchange known 
as “LocalBitcoins.”48 In separate sting operations seeking “individuals 
engaged in high volume Bitcoin activity,” undercover officers informed 
Reid and Espinoza that the officers were using Bitcoin to purchase stolen 
credit card numbers.49 Reid sold to members of the United States Secret 
Service’s Miami Electronic Crimes Task Force (“Task Force”), a unit 
comprised of state and local agents, twenty–six thousand five hundred 
dollars ($26,500) worth of bitcoins and was charged in violation of state 
money laundering and unlicensed money service business statutes.50 Reid 
accepted a plea agreement on September 16, 2015, and has been sentenced 
to serve five (5) years of probation.51 
                                                                                                             
45 Susannah Nesmith, Miami Bitcoin Arrests may be First State Prosecution, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 10, 2014, 1:27 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-
02-09/miami-bitcoin-arrests-may-be-first-state-prosecution. 
46 See United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); United States v. 
Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, No. 4:13–CV–416, 2013 WL 4028182 
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013). 
47 See Nesmith, supra note 45 at 1. The Miami–Dade County State Attorney announced, 
“The use of Bitcoins . . . is a new technological flourish to this very old crime [of money 
laundering and these] arrests may be the first state prosecutions involving the use of 
[b]itcoins in money laundering operations.” 
48 See id. 
49 Id. 
50 See Id.; Jerin Mathew, Pascal Reid and Michell Abner Espinoza Bitcoin Trial: ‘Money 
Laundering Using Bitcoin Not Crime, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014, 8:13 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/pascal-reid-michell-abner-espinoza-bitcoin-trial-money-
laundering-using-bitcoin-not-crime-1438268. 
51 See Harvey Ruvin Clerk of the Courts for Miami–Dade County, Miami–Dade County 
Criminal Justice Online System, https://www2.miami-dadeclerk.com/cjis/CaseSearch.
aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
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State of Florida v. Michel Abner Espinoza 
On December 4, 2013, Detective Ricardo Arias, a member of the 
Miami Beach Police Department, and Special Agent Gregory Ponzi of the 
United States Secret Service accessed a peer–to–peer Bitcoin exchange 
website seeking to purchase Bitcoin.52 Arias and Ponzi contacted 
Espinoza, a user identified by the username on the website as 
“Michelhack,” who represented himself as a seller and dictated that 
interested buyers would have to pay for the bitcoins in cash and in 
person.53 Acting in an undercover capacity and contacting Espinoza 
through text message correspondences with Espinoza’s listed phone 
number, Arias arranged a meeting with Espinoza.54 
On December 5, 2013, as a result of this meeting, Espinoza agreed to 
sell 0.4032258 bitcoins to Arias in exchange for five hundred dollars 
($500) in cash.55 However, during this meeting, there was no discussion 
of illegal activity or stolen credit cards as Arias’ fabricated purpose for 
these recently purchase bitcoins.56 On January 10, 2014, Arias arranged a 
second meeting with Espinoza for the purchase of one (1) bitcoin in 
exchange for one thousand dollars ($1,000).57 At this meeting, Arias 
informed Espinoza that he was in the business of buying stolen credit card 
numbers and that the bitcoins would be used to pay for such information.58 
On January 30, 2014, Arias arranged with Espinoza a third Bitcoin 
                                                                                                             
52 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016). “LocalBitcoins.com” 
is a website that allowed users who wished to sell Bitcoin to create an online advertisement 
conveying the amount of Bitcoin that the user was offering and the asking price. Then, 
potential buyers could browse the website’s advertisements and may arrange to purchase 
Bitcoin, either electronically online or in–person, with any seller who had posted. 
53 See id. at 2. Arias and Ponzi elected Espinoza for the newly established investigation 
not because of any previous reports that Espinoza was engaged in any illicit criminal 
activity, but rather because his username, availability, and his desire to meet in public 
places. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. During this meeting on December 5, 2013, Espinoza explained to Arias how 
he had made a profit of eighty–three dollars and sixty–seven cents ($83.67) from this 
Bitcoin transaction: by purchasing the Bitcoin at ten percent (10%) under market value and 
selling it at a five percent (5%) above market value. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. Arias also asked if Espinoza would be willing to accept any stolen credit card 
numbers as a trade for Bitcoin in their next transaction; Espinoza allegedly replied that he 
would consider such a form of payment. However, there was no evidence that Espinoza 
actually accepted stolen credit card numbers as payment for any subsequent Bitcoin 
transaction with Arias. 
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transaction for five hundred dollars ($500) worth of Bitcoin, which was 
completed in its entirety through text message communication.59 
On February 6, 2014, Arias and Espinoza met for a fourth Bitcoin 
transaction; this time, Arias sought to purchase the equivalent of thirty 
thousand dollars ($30,000) in Bitcoin.60 During this meeting, Arias further 
explained that his illicit credit card operation, which Arias had fabricated 
as part of his undercover investigation, worked by purchasing the stolen 
credit cards wholesale with Bitcoin and then reselling the information at a 
marked–up price.61 Arias presented Espinoza with thirty thousand dollars 
($30,000) in cash, which were actually undercover funds that were 
counterfeit.62 Espinoza never took possession of the counterfeit money, 
but was subsequently arrested.63 
The State of Florida charged Espinoza with one count of operating and 
engaging in an unlawful money services business in violation of Fla. Stat. 
§ 560.125(5)(a) (the “Florida Business Services Statute”) and two counts 
of money laundering in violation of § 896.101(3)(c) (the “Florida Anti–
Money Laundering Statute”).64 On July 22, 2016, Eleventh Judicial Circuit 
Court Judge for Miami–Dade County, Teresa Pooler, granted Espinoza’s 
Motion to Dismiss as to all three counts.65 On August 10, 2016, Assistant 
State Attorney, Thomas Haggerty, of the State Attorney’s Office filed an 
appeal to Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal.66 At the time of this 
comment’s publication, a date for the appellate hearings had not yet been 
scheduled.67 
II. THE MONEY LAUNDERING CHARGES 
In Espinoza, Circuit Court Judge Pooler incorrectly dismissed both 
money laundering counts because of a failure to consider whether Bitcoin 
constitutes “funds” under the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute as 
well as the improper applications of the lenity and void–for–vagueness 
doctrines. The Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute provides that  
                                                                                                             
59 See id. at 2–3. 
60 See id. at 3. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. Espinoza, fearing that the cash was counterfeit, desired to bring portions of the 
money to the bank “a little at a time” in order to verify its authenticity. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. at 8. 
66 Florida Third District Court of Appeal Docket, State v. Espinoza, No. 3D16–1860, 
http://jweb.flcourts.org/pls/ds/ds_docket (last visited Aug. 18, 2017). Court records from 
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in and for Miami–Dade County were received by the 
Third District Court of Appeal on January 6, 2017. 
67 See id. 
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it is unlawful for a person to conduct or attempt to conduct 
a financial transaction which involves property or 
proceeds which an investigative or law enforcement 
officer . . . represents as being derived from, or as being 
used to conduct or facilitate, specified unlawful activity, 
when the person’s conduct or attempted conduct is 
undertaken with the intent: (1) to promote the carrying on 
of specified unlawful activity or (2) to conceal or disguise 
the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the 
control of the proceeds or property believed to be the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . .68  
Thus, the critical question for the Espinoza court to consider became 
whether Espinoza’s Bitcoin transaction with Arias fell under the statutory 
definition of “financial transaction.” 
The Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute defines “financial 
transaction” as “a transaction involving the movement of funds by wire or 
other means or involving one or more monetary instruments, which in any 
way or degree affects commerce . . . .”69 By this statutory definition, the 
Espinoza court should have concluded that Espinoza’s Bitcoin transaction 
with Arias did qualify as a financial transaction and, therefore, fell within 
the purview of the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute if bitcoins 
constitute (1) “funds” or (2) “monetary instruments.” Although the term 
“funds” is not defined, the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute 
defines “monetary instruments” as “coin or currency of the United States 
or of any other country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, 
money orders, investment securities in bearer form . . . and negotiable 
instruments in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto 
passes upon delivery.”70 Virtual or digital currencies are not specifically 
defined or included in either definition.71 
Bitcoins Constitute “Funds” under Applicable Anti–Money 
Laundering Statutes 
Although it is proper that bitcoins do not fall under the Florida Anti–
Money Laundering Statute’s definition of “monetary instruments,” 
Bitcoin transactions still qualify as “financial transactions” because 
bitcoins constitute “funds.” As previously mentioned, a financial 
                                                                                                             
68 FLA. STAT. § 896.101(3)(c) (2016) (emphasis added). 
69 FLA. STAT. § 896.101(2)(d) (2016) (emphasis added). 
70 FLA. STAT. § 896.101(2)(e) (2016). 
71 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016). 
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transaction is any “transaction involving the movement of funds by wire 
or other means or involving one or more monetary instruments, which in 
any way or degree affects commerce.”72 This is a mutually exclusive 
definition that sets forth two prongs. The first prong defines a “financial 
transaction” as any transaction involving the movement of funds by wire 
or other means, which in any way or degree affects commerce. The second 
prong defines “financial transaction” as any transaction involving one or 
more monetary instruments, which in any way or degree affects 
commerce. 
Because Espinoza is the first case to consider Bitcoin under the Florida 
Anti–Money Laundering Statute, there is no precedent as to whether 
bitcoins constitute “funds” under the Florida Anti–Money Laundering 
Statute itself. However, unlike in Florida, there is substantial precedent in 
the Federal court system as it pertains to digital currencies, particularly 
Bitcoin, and their statuses within various federal statutes.73 This is 
noteworthy because the provisions of the Florida Anti–Money Laundering 
Statute virtually mirror the elements of its federal counterpart, the Federal 
Anti–Money Laundering Statute. Accordingly, because the Florida and the 
Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statutes are substantively identical, the 
Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statute’s definition of “financial 
transaction” also includes “funds” and “monetary instruments.”74 Also 
                                                                                                             
72 § 896.101(2)(d) (emphasis added). 
73 See United States v. Murgio, No. 15–cr–769, 2016 LEXIS 131745 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); 
United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); United States v. 
Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, No. 
4:13–CV–416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013); Tanaya Macheel, Four Court 
Cases Helping Shape the U.S. Stance on Bitcoin, COINDESK (Sept. 28, 2014, 2:09 PM), 
http://www.coindesk.com/4-court-cases-helping-determine-us-stance-bitcoin/; Shavers, 
2013 WL 4028182 at *1. Trendon Shavers, the founder and operator of Bitcoin Savings 
and Trust, was fined forty million dollars ($40,000,000) by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) for allegedly defrauding investors of a Bitcoin Ponzi scheme by 
making a number of misrepresentations to investors regarding the nature of the 
investments. The case against Shavers was brought before Magistrate Judge Amos L. 
Mazzant of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas pursuant to 
alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and Exchange Act of 1934. In his 
Memorandum Opinion Regarding the Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Magistrate 
Judge Mazzant held that it was clear that Bitcoin could be used as “money” because it 
could be used to purchase goods or services, pay for individual living expenses, and be 
exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, Euro, and Yen. Magistrate 
Judge Mazzant noted that “the only limitation of Bitcoin is that it is limited to those places 
that accept it as currency.” Magistrate Judge Mazzant concluded that “Bitcoin is a currency 
or form of money, and investors wishing to invest in [Bitcoin Savings and Trust] provided 
an investment of money.” 
74 Laundering of Monetary Instruments, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)–(2) (1988). The Federal 
Anti–Money Laundering Statute states that “[w]hoever, knowing that the property 
involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful 
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important is the fact that the term “funds” in both the Florida and Federal 
Anti–Money Laundering Statutes is undefined; requiring courts to 
interpret the term in light of its plain meaning. 
Particularly, “in construing a federal statute, a Florida court will look 
to related decisions of the federal courts in an attempt to construe it in a 
manner that will best effectuate its purpose.”75 The Florida legislature’s 
intent to develop a “strategic state–based anti–money laundering initiative 
is clear from the tailored nature of the [Florida] statutes quilted together 
by federal statutory stitching.”76 Although Espinoza was prosecuted under 
Florida statutes, these statutes were modeled after the federal money 
laundering statutes; therefore, the Espinoza court should have at least 
considered how federal courts addressed Bitcoin under the Federal Anti–
Money Laundering Statute for guidance.77 Because the Florida legislature, 
like the U.S. Congress, did not provide a statutory definition of “funds” 
within the pertinent money laundering statute, the Espinoza court should 
have, and indeed did, however incorrectly, construe “funds” in its ordinary 
sense by ascertaining the plain or ordinary meaning of “funds” by 
reference to a dictionary.78 
By conducting such plain and ordinary meaning analyses, several 
notable federal cases have concluded that bitcoins qualify as “funds,” and 
therefore Bitcoin transactions are “financial transactions,” pursuant to the 
                                                                                                             
activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves 
the proceeds . . . (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful 
activity; or . . . (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part (i) to conceal 
or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds 
of specified unlawful activity . . . shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than [five hundred 
thousand dollars] $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, 
whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.”; 18 U.S.C. 
§1956(c)(4) (1988). The statute defines “financial transaction” as “(A) a transaction which 
in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (i) involving the movement of 
funds by wire or other means or (ii) involving one or more monetary instruments . . . .” The 
statute further defines “monetary instruments” as “(i) coin or currency of the United States 
or of any other country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders, 
or (ii) investment securities or negotiable instruments . . . .” 
75 48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 108 (2014). 
76 Israel Reyes, Florida’s Anti–Money Laundering Statutes, FLA. BAR J. (July/Aug. 
1999), https://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Author/FA4AF4C5C0F457
DE85256ADB005D6287 (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
77 See 48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 124 (2014). When the legislature has not given a term 
a statutory definition, the courts should construe a term in such a manner that would be in 
accordance with the literal meaning of the term as well as give effect to both the objective 
and the purpose of the statute. 
78 48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 126 (2014). “Where the legislature has not defined the 
words used in a statute, the language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.” 
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Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statute. In United States v. Faiella,79 
United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, Jed S. 
Rakoff, held that Bitcoin “qualified as [both] ‘money’ or ‘funds’ under the 
plain meaning definitions of those terms because Bitcoin could be easily 
purchased in exchange for ordinary currency, acted as a denominator of 
value, and was used to conduct financial transactions.”80 In acknowledging 
that the Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statute refers to “funds” rather 
than “money,” the Faiella court reasoned that Bitcoin fit the plain 
language meaning of “funds” according to the Merriam–Webster 
Dictionary, which is “‘available money’ or ‘an amount of something that 
is available for use: a supply of something.’” Similarly, in United States v. 
Ulbricht,81 United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of 
                                                                                                             
79 United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); See Tanaya 
Macheel, Four Court Cases Helping Shape the U.S. Stance on Bitcoin, COINDESK (Sept. 
28, 2014, 2:09 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/4-court-cases-helping-determine-us-
stance-bitcoin/. Amongst others, Robert Faiella was charged with two (2) counts of 
operating an unlicensed money transmitting business pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and one 
(1) count of money laundering conspiracy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) in connection 
with his alleged participation with the underground market website, the “Silk Road,” and 
the use of Bitcoin. 
80 Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 545. For support of his opinion, District Judge Rakoff 
looked to the ordinary meaning of “money” as defined by the Merriam–Webster 
Dictionary, which defined the term as “something generally accepted as a medium of 
exchange, a measure of value, or a means of payment.” Additionally, District Judge Rakoff 
held that Faiella “qualified as a ‘money transmitter’ for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 
because virtual currency exchangers constitute[s] ‘money transmitters.’” 
81 See United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 569–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Amongst 
three other counts including narcotics trafficking and computer hacking conspiracies, Ross 
Ulbricht was charged with money laundering conspiracy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956 by 
designing, launching, and administering the online marketplace website for the sale of 
illicit goods and services, known as the “Silk Road.” More specifically, the government 
alleged that Ulbricht conspired with individuals by engaging in thousands of unlawful 
transactions that occurred on the site over the course of three (3) years following its launch. 
These unlawful transactions were said to include the buying and selling of illegal narcotics 
and malicious computer software as well as opportunity to laundering the proceeds of such 
sales using Bitcoin. The Silk Road operated much like eBay in that “a seller would 
electronically post a good or service for sale; a buyer would electronically purchase the 
item; the seller would then ship or otherwise provide to the buyer the purchased item; the 
buyer would provide feedback; and the site operator would receive a portion of the seller’s 
revenue as a commission.” However, unlike eBay, the Silk Road was only available to 
users that utilized “Tor, a [computer] software and network that allows for anonymous, 
untraceable Internet browsing.” Also unlike eBay, the only form of payment permitted 
between buyers and sellers on the Silk Road was Bitcoin. This allowed the buyers and 
sellers, as well as Ulbricht, to engaged in transactions anonymously on the Silk Road while 
being anywhere in the world with an Internet connection. The only points of contact with 
the buyers and sellers were a username, which was often fake, and the address to where the 
items would be sent or the services rendered. When it began in 2011, the Silk road served 
primarily drug users who sought marijuana, Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD), Ecstasy, 
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New York, Katherine B. Forrest, addressed Ulbricht’s argument that 
bitcoins are not money because virtual currencies have some, but not all 
of the attributes of currency such as legal tender status, and, therefore, 
transactions involving Bitcoin cannot be prosecutable under current 
money laundering statutes.82 The Ulbricht court stated that it is clear from 
the plain meaning of the statutory language that “financial transaction” 
captures the movement of “funds” by any means.83 Like money, “funds” 
are objects used either to pay for things directly or as a medium of 
exchange.84 The Ulbricht court reasoned that “[b]itcoins carry value—that 
is their purpose and function—and act as a medium of exchange.”85 The 
Ulbricht court held that the Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statute is 
sufficiently broad to consider Bitcoin in financial transactions and that one 
can launder money using Bitcoin as a medium.86 
Because there was no Florida case law precedent available to guide 
the Espinoza court in determining whether bitcoins are “funds” under the 
Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute, it seems logical that the Espinoza 
court should have looked to the how the federal courts have dealt with the 
issue in regard to the substantively identical Federal Anti–Money 
Laundering Statute. However, the Espinoza court ignored the question of 
whether bitcoins qualified as “funds.” Rather, the Espinoza court 
                                                                                                             
and prescription medication from sellers across the world. As the website grew in 
popularity, it began to host sellers who offered other illicit products and services, including 
forged documents and fake driver’s licenses. By the time the Silk Road was shut down, 
“the site had sales revenue of more than 9.5 million bitcoins, valued at about 1.2 billion 
dollars [($1,200,000,000)].” As mentioned, Ulbricht was arrested in San Francisco, 
California, on October 2, 2013 and was charged with one (1) count of participation in a 
narcotics trafficking conspiracy, one (1) count of continuing a criminal enterprise, one (1) 
count of computer hacking conspiracy, and one (1) count of money laundering conspiracy. 
Ulbricht’s case was brought before a United States District Court Judge for the Southern 
District of New York, Katherine B. Forrest, and the trial began on January 13, 2015. 
Ulbricht was convicted by a jury on February 4, 2015, and sentenced to life in prison on 
May 29, 2015. See Joseph Goldstein, Arrest in U.S. Shuts Down a Black Market for 
Narcotics, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/nyregion/
operator-of-online-market-for-illegal-drugs-is-charged-fbi-says.html. Ulbricht, who was 
known by the username “Dread Pirate Roberts,” was arrested in San Francisco, California, 
on October 2, 2013. The government estimates that Ulbricht collected sales commissions 
of more than six hundred thousand (600,000) bitcoins, the equivalent of eighty million 
dollars ($80,000,000). 
82 See Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 569. 
83 See id. at 570. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. at 548, 570. (“[T]he only value for Bitcoin lies in its ability to pay for things – 
it is digital and has no earthly form; it cannot be put on a shelf and looked at or collected 
in a nice display case.”) 
86 See id. at 571. “Congress intended to prevent criminals from finding ways to wash 
proceeds of criminal activity by transferring proceeds to other similar . . . . items that store 
significant value.” 
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overlooked “funds” when considering the statutory definition of “financial 
transaction” and relied upon its earlier analysis of “payment instrument” 
under the Florida Business Services Statute as a surrogate for the statutory 
definition of “monetary instrument.”87 However, the term “funds” is not 
included within the Florida Business Services Statute’s definition of 
“payment instrument” and is only within the Florida Anti–Money 
Laundering Statute’s first prong of “financial transaction.”88 It is likely 
that if the Espinoza court considered whether bitcoins were “funds,” the 
court would have reached a concurring conclusion with those of the federal 
courts. 
“Funds” are “a sum of money or other resources . . . set apart for a 
specific objective” or “available pecuniary resources”89 and “money” is 
“something generally accepted as a medium of exchange, a measure of 
value, or a means of payment.”90 The primary purpose and function of 
bitcoins, unlike cigarettes or other goods, is to act as a medium of 
exchange and means of payment. Without these exchange or payment 
functions, Bitcoin serves no other practical purpose to users. 
The Espinoza Court Incorrectly Analyzed “Monetary Instruments” 
Although the Espinoza court’s conclusion that bitcoins are not 
“monetary instruments” is correct, the court reached the conclusion 
through flawed reasoning and careless oversight of elements comprising 
the statutory definition of “financial transaction.” The Espinoza court’s 
analysis of Espinoza’s actions under the Florida Anti–Money Laundering 
Statute and conclusion that Bitcoin transactions were not “financial 
transactions” are incorrect because the court improperly relied upon its 
conclusion that bitcoins do not qualify as “payment instruments” within 
the Florida Business Services Statute to conclude that Bitcoin could not 
constitute a “monetary instrument” under the Florida Anti–Money 
Laundering Statute. The Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute defines 
“monetary instruments” as  
coin or currency of the United States or of any other 
country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, 
                                                                                                             
87 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 6–7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016); United States v. 
Murgio, No. 15–cr–769, 2016 LEXIS 131745 at *28 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
88 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 3–6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016). 
89 Pecuniary, MERRIAM–WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
pecuniary (last visited Aug. 26, 2016) (meaning “consisting of or measured in money.”). 
90 Money, MERRIAM–WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/money 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2017). 
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money orders, investment securities in bearer form . . . 
and negotiable instruments in bearer form or otherwise in 
such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.91 
While none of these enumerated items sufficiently qualifies bitcoins 
as “monetary instruments,” the Espinoza court immediately forewent any 
analysis of whether bitcoins are “monetary instruments” and concluded, 
that because bitcoins are not “payment instruments” under the Florida 
Business Services Statute, bitcoins are cannot be “monetary instruments” 
under the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute.92 Further, the Espinoza 
court reasoned that “if the statute is read to mean that in the transaction, 
[Espinoza] must be the party who uses the monetary instruments, then the 
money laundering statute would not apply . . . because Bitcoins, as 
previously discussed, are not monetary instruments.”93 However, the 
Espinoza court reasoned that the “more likely interpretation of the 
[applicable money laundering] statute is that as long as one party of the 
transaction [(Espinoza or Arias)] . . . is using a monetary instrument, a 
financial transaction has occurred.”94 This reasoning is deeply flawed and 
misleading to opinion readers. Not only does it ignore the first prong of 
“financial transaction” referring to “funds,” but it also implies that 
“payment instruments” within the Florida Business Services Statute and 
“monetary instruments” within the Florida Anti–Money Statute are 
defined identically and are comprised of the same items. This is not the 
case as a “payment instrument” is “a check, draft, warrant, money order, 
traveler’s check, electronic instrument, or other instrument, payment of 
money, or monetary value whether or not negotiable.”95 
While “payment instruments” of the Florida Business Services Statute 
and “monetary instruments” of the Florida Anti–Money Laundering 
Statute include overlapping items such as checks, money orders, and 
negotiable instruments, the statutory definitions have a few notable 
differences. The term “payment instruments” also includes electronic 
instruments and the payment of money while the term “monetary 
instruments” includes coin or currency of the United States or of any 
country. Arguably, “payment instruments” is defined more broadly and, 
therefore, renders analyzing “monetary instrument” unnecessary after 
concluding that bitcoins are not “payment instruments” because bitcoins 
are not “money” pursuant to the Florida Business Services Statute. 
                                                                                                             
91 FLA. STAT. § 896.101(2)(e) (2016). 
92 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 6–7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 4. 
95 FLA STAT. § 560.103(29) (2016). 
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However, the Espinoza court’s use of “payment instruments” as a 
surrogate for the definition of “monetary payment” can mislead readers as 
well as cause errors in the analysis of “financial transactions.” Such an 
error occurred when the Espinoza court overlooked “funds” as an 
independent prong under the definition of “financial transaction.” 
The Espinoza Court Improperly Applied the Doctrinal Rule of 
Lenity 
The Espinoza court’s application of the doctrinal rule of lenity is 
improper because, as in Ulbricht, there is no statutory ambiguity. The 
doctrinal rule of lenity directs courts to strictly construe criminal statutes 
in a manner most favorable to defendants when the statutory language is 
susceptible to different reasonable interpretations.96 More specifically, 
“doubts regarding the meanings of terms . . . must be resolved in the 
defendant’s favor” against the State.97 However, the rule of lenity is 
“reserved . . . for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists 
about a statute’s intended scope even after resort[ing] to ‘the language and 
structure, legislative history, and motivating policies.’”98 That is, “this rule 
of lenity is a canon of last resort and only applies if the [penal] statute 
remains ambiguous after consulting traditional canons of statutory 
construction.”99 A statute is ambiguous if the language is subject to more 
than one reasonable interpretation and outcome; however, just because the 
legislature may not have contemplated the applicability of the statute in a 
particular situation does not make the statute ambiguous.100 “For a statute 
                                                                                                             
96 16 FLA. CRIM. JUR. 2D CRIM. LAW, Construction in Favor of Accused § 14 (2017); see 
also United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing United 
States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 2006), which stated, “[C]riminal statutes must 
be strictly construed most favorably to the accused when they are subject to competing, 
albeit reasonable, interpretations.”); Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (citing Rewis v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971), which stated that because “restraint must be exercised in 
determining the breadth of conduct prohibited by a federal criminal stature out of concerns 
regarding both the prerogatives of Congress and the need to give fair warning to those 
whose conduct is affected,” the doctrinal rule of lenity requires “that when a criminal 
statute is susceptible to two different interpretations – one more and one less favorable to 
the defendant – ‘leniency’ requires that the court read it in the manner more favorable.”). 
97 16 FLA. CRIM. JUR. 2D CRIM. LAW, Construction in Favor of Accused § 14 (2017). 
98 United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
99 Paul v. State, 112 So. 3d 1188, 1195 (Fla. 2013); See also 16 FLA. CRIM. JUR. 2D CRIM. 
LAW, Construction in Favor of Accused § 14 (2017) (stating “[a]bsent any ambiguity, the 
rule of lenity does not apply.”). 
100 See 48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 115 (2014). “A statute can be unambiguous without 
addressing every interpretative theory offered by a party. There is a difference between 
ambiguity and unexpressed [legislative] intention.” 
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to be unambiguous, it need only be plain to anyone reading an act that the 
statute encompasses the conduct at issue.”101 
The Espinoza court concluded that, although Arias conveyed that he 
was planning to trade the Bitcoin from Espinoza for stolen credit card 
numbers, Arias had not clearly represented that the cash that was being 
paid to Espinoza was the proceeds of any illegal transaction.102 The 
Espinoza court continued by stating that the money laundering statute 
requires that Espinoza “undertake the transaction with the intent to 
promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity,” but finds the 
vagueness of the term “promote” to be troublesome.103 Because there is no 
statutory definition of the term “promote,” the Espinoza court looked to 
the plain language meaning of the word “promoter,” which is “someone 
who encourages or incites.”104 Concluding that the plain language meaning 
of the word is too vague, the Espinoza court stated that “[t]his Court is 
unwilling to punish a man for selling his property to another, when his 
actions fall under a statute that is so vaguely written that even legal 
professionals have difficulty finding a singular meaning.”105 
The Ulbricht court also addressed the question of whether statutes 
governing many of the charges that Ulbricht faced were ambiguous when 
applied to his alleged conduct and concluded that application of the 
doctrinal rule of lenity was inappropriate.106 The Ulbricht court rejected 
Ulbricht’s argument for the doctrinal rule of leniency because Ulbricht had 
not alleged 
that a word or phrase in a statute . . . is susceptible to more 
than one interpretation[, but rather Ulbricht] argues that 
even if the elements of a . . . conspiracy are well known, 
his particular conduct in designing and operating the 
website does not clearly fall within what the statute is 
intended to cover.107  
                                                                                                             
101 Id. 
102 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. (citing Promoter, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed., 2014)). 
105 Id. 
106 United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 566–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
107 Id. at 566–67. The Ulbricht court clarified that, as a general principle, the doctrinal 
rule of leniency does not require that clear, unambiguous statutes be applied in a lenient 
manner; the doctrinal rule of leniency should only be applied if and when there is 
ambiguity. 
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The Ulbricht court concluded that “there is no statutory ambiguity and thus 
no basis for the application of the rule of lenity.”108 
Like in Ulbricht, dismissal based on the doctrinal rule of lenity was 
improper in Espinoza because the term “promote” is not susceptible to 
more than one interpretation such that the statute becomes ambiguous. 
Even assuming that the Espinoza court was correct in concluding that 
Arias had not clearly represented that the cash paid to Espinoza in the 
Bitcoin exchange were the proceeds of any illegal transaction, it is 
reasonable that Espinoza knew, or at least should have known, that the 
cash, or a portion of the cash, was acquired by Arias through some illegal 
activity, particularly considering Arias’ proposition to pay Espinoza for 
the bitcoins with stolen credit card information.109 With such knowledge 
regarding the origins of the cash paid in exchange for the bitcoins, 
Espinoza encouraged or, at the very least, facilitated the carrying on of the 
unlawful sale of stolen credit card information, even if Arias did not 
explicitly state that the proceeds were the gained from the unlawful 
activity. Additionally, just because Congress and the Florida Legislature 
may not have contemplated the applicability of the Federal or Florida 
Anti–Money Laundering Statutes in a particular situation involving 
cryptocurrency does not make the statute ambiguous.110 “For a statute to 
be unambiguous, it need only be plain to anyone reading an act that the 
statute encompasses the conduct at issue.”111 In Espinoza, it is clear that 
Espinoza’s supply of bitcoins “promoted” and enabled Arias’ fabricated 
stolen credit card scheme in violation of the Florida Anti–Money 
Laundering Statute; therefore, there is neither ambiguity nor grounds for 
the application of the doctrinal rule of lenity. 
Application of the Void–for–Vagueness Doctrine is Improper 
Although not specifically cited to by the Espinoza court in its decision, 
it is important to note that application of the void–for–vagueness doctrine 
would be improper as a means of dismissing the money laundering 
charges. The Espinoza court suggested a possible application of the void–
for–vagueness doctrine when it concluded that it was “unwilling to punish 
                                                                                                             
108 Id. at 567; see also United States v. Budovsky, No. 13cr368 (DLC), 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 127717, at *35 (rejecting arguments in favor of application of the rule of lenity 
because “[h]aving considered the text, purpose, and legislative history . . . , there is no 
ambiguity that would require resort to the rule of lenity.”). 
109 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016). 
110 See 48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes §115 (2014) (stating that “[a] statute can be 
unambiguous without addressing every interpretative theory offered by a party. There is a 
difference between ambiguity and unexpressed [legislative] intention”). 
111 Id. 
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a man for selling his property to another, when his actions fall under a 
statute that is so vaguely written that even legal professionals have 
difficulty finding a singular meaning.”112 The void–for–vagueness 
doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with 
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct 
is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.113 The underlying justification of the void–
for–vagueness doctrine is that no individual should be held criminally 
liable or responsible for conduct that a reasonable person would not have 
known to be prohibited under the applicable statute.114 In order for the 
void–for–vagueness doctrine to apply, a court must hold that “the statute 
is so vague and lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt that . . . it failed 
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated 
conduct was forbidden.”115 However, it is important to note that the statute 
must be impermissibly vague in all of its applications for a valid void–for–
vagueness claim to be established.116 
Although Bitcoin’s involvement in a defendant’s actions prosecuted 
pursuant to the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute complicates the 
case’s analysis, application of the void–for–vagueness doctrine is 
improper because Espinoza had fair notice that his contemplated conduct 
was forbidden. In Ulbricht, the court stated that “the fact that a particular 
defendant [Ulbricht] is the first to be prosecuted for novel conduct under 
a pre–existing statutory scheme does not ipso facto mean that the statute 
is ambiguous, . . . vague, or that [the defendant] has been deprived of 
constitutionally appropriate notice.”117 Holding that the void–for–
vagueness doctrine is inapplicable, the Ulbricht court stated that a 
vagueness challenge is avoided when a statute “define[s] a criminal 
offense in a manner that ordinary people . . . understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.”118 Because “no person of ordinary 
intelligence could believe that [Ulbricht’s] conduct, [the intentional 
                                                                                                             
112 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016) (emphasis added). 
113 See 16 FLA. JUR. 2D Requirement of certainty; vagueness § 10 (2014) (stating that 
“[t]he language of the statute must provide adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits when 
measured by common understanding and practice . . . .”). 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. (stating that “[t]he legislature’s failure to define a statutory term does not in 
and of itself render a penal provision unconstitutionally vague, nor does imprecise language 
render a statute fatally vague, so long as the language conveys sufficiently definite warning 
as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices”). 
117 United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
118 See id. at 567. 
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conduct to join with narcotics traffickers or computer hackers to help sell 
illegal drugs or hack into computers], is somehow legal,” the Ulbricht 
court concluded that there was nothing vague about the application of the 
statute to Ulbricht’s alleged conduct.119 
Similar to the Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statute in Ulbricht, the 
Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute in Espinoza is neither ambiguous 
nor vague. As in Ulbricht, the Espinoza court must reason that no person 
of ordinary intelligence could believe that Espinoza’s sale of bitcoins to 
Arias to further facilitate a scheme involving the illegal sale of stolen 
credit card information is somehow legal. Furthermore, the Florida Anti–
Money Laundering Statute must be impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications for a valid void–for–vagueness claim to be established, which 
it is not. The alleged vagueness of the term “promote” is improper as it has 
been relied upon in many prior cases pursuant to the prosecution of money 
laundering violations in Florida. Therefore, because the Florida Anti–
Money Laundering Statute provided Espinoza with sufficient notice that 
his sale of bitcoins was prohibited and the Statute is not impermissibly 
vague in all situations, a dismissal based on the void–for–vagueness 
doctrine is inappropriate. 
III. THE UNLAWFUL MONEY SERVICES BUSINESS CHARGE 
The Espinoza court dismissed the Florida Business Services Statute 
charge against Espinoza for reasons that depend on determining whether 
Bitcoin qualifies as “monetary value.” By erroneously concluding that 
bitcoins cannot be “money” or constitute “monetary value,” the Espinoza 
court held that Espinoza could not be engaged in a money services 
business because he was not acting as an “instrument seller.” Moreover, 
the Espinoza court also concluded that Espinoza was not a “money 
transmitter” under the Florida Business Services Statute because the sale 
of bitcoins to Arias in exchange for cash was not done for the purpose of 
transmitting the same by any means. Although this paper agrees that 
Espinoza’s sale of bitcoins to Arias should not qualify Espinoza as a 
“money transmitter” pursuant to the Florida Business Services Statute, the 
conclusion that Espinoza did not engage in a “money services business” is 
nonetheless incorrect because bitcoins do constitute “monetary value” 
and, therefore, qualify as “payment instruments.” 
The Florida Business Services Statute states that “a person may not 
engage in the business of a money services business . . . in this state unless 
the person is licensed or exempted from licensure.”120 Similar to the two–
                                                                                                             
119 See id. at 568. 
120 See FLA. STAT. § 560.125(1) (2016) (emphasis added). 
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pronged definition of “financial transaction” in the Florida Anti–Money 
Laundering Statute, the Florida Business Services Statute defines “money 
services business” by providing mutually exclusive categories. The 
Florida Business Services Statute defines “money services business” as “a 
person . . . who acts as a payment instrument seller, foreign currency 
exchanger, check cashier, or money transmitter.”121 For the purposes of 
this analysis, such a definition means that an individual has engaged in the 
business of a money services business in violation of the Florida Business 
Services Statute if he either (1) acted as a “payment instrument seller” or 
(2) acted as a “money transmitter.” 
The statutory language of the Florida Business Services Statute 
specifically defines “payment instrument seller” as “a corporation, limited 
liability company, limited liability partnership, or foreign entity qualified 
to do business in this state which sells a payment instrument,”122 and 
defines a “payment instrument” as “a check, draft, warrant, money order, 
traveler’s check, electronic instrument, or other instrument, payment of 
money, or monetary value whether or not negotiable.”123 The Florida 
Business Services Statute defines “money transmitter” as “a corporation, 
limited liability company, limited liability partnership, or foreign entity 
qualified to do business in this state which receives currency, monetary 
value, or payment instruments for the purpose of transmitting the same by 
any means, including transmission by wire, facsimile, electronic transfer, 
courier, [or] the Internet . . . .”124 “Monetary value” is defined within the 
Florida Business Services Statute as “a medium of exchange, whether or 
not redeemable in currency.”125 
Bitcoins Constitute “Money” or “Monetary Value” 
Like “funds” pursuant to the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute 
charges, precedent was not available to the Espinoza court to determine 
whether Bitcoin qualified as “monetary value” under the Florida Business 
Services Statute charge. However, also like the money laundering charges, 
there is substantial precedent in regards to how the federal courts have 
                                                                                                             
121 FLA. STAT. § 560.103(22) (2016) (emphasis added). 
122 § 560.103(30). 
123 See § 560.103(29)–(30). 
124 § 560.103(23) (emphasis added); see also § 560.125(5)(a) and (b). The statute 
continues by stating that “a person who violates this section, if the violation involves: (a) 
currency or payment instruments exceeding [three hundred dollars] $300 but less than 
[twenty thousand dollars] $20,000 in any 12–month period, commits a felony of the third 
degree . . . or (b) currency or payment instruments totaling or exceeding [twenty thousand 
dollars] $20,000 but less than [one hundred thousand dollars] $100,000 in any 12–month 
period, commits a felony of the second degree.” 
125 § 560.103(21). 
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dealt with Bitcoin and its involvement in the unlawful engagement into a 
money services business.126 In regards to the federal government’s 
prohibition of an unlicensed money transmitting business, 18 U.S.C. § 
1960 (the “Federal Money Services Business Statute”) states that 
“[w]hoever knowingly conducts, controls, manages, supervises, directs, or 
owns all or part of an unlicensed money transmitting business, shall be 
fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”127 The Federal 
Money Services Business Statute defines “unlicensed money transmitting 
business” and “money transmitting” differently than the Florida Business 
Services Statute defines “money services business” and “money 
transmitter.”128 However, because the Florida Legislature enacted the 
Florida Business Services Statute largely based upon the Federal Money 
Services Business Statute,129 Congress’ legislative intent in enacting the 
Federal Money Services Business Statute should be considered when 
analyzing the Florida Business Services Statute. 
The legislative history of the Federal Money Services Business Statute 
is clear. It was enacted to serve as an anti–money laundering statute; 
particularly intended to stop or thwart the movement of illegitimate funds 
connected to the drug trade.130 At the time of enactment, Congress feared 
that drug dealers would be begin to more frequently utilize “non–bank 
financial institutions” in order to convert illegitimate cash and currency 
into “monetary instruments,” thereby allowing the drug dealers to more 
easily launder the proceeds of any illicit transaction.131 That is, Federal 
Money Services Business Statute “was enacted to address the fact that 
‘money launderers with illicit profits ha[d] found new avenues of entry 
into the financial system [and prevent innovative ways of transmitting 
                                                                                                             
126 See United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 707–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); United 
States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
127 18 U.S.C. §1960(a) (2006). 
128 An “unlicensed money transmitting business” is “a money transmitting business 
which affects interstate or foreign commerce in any manner or degree and . . . involves the 
transportation or transmission of funds that are known to the defendant to have been 
derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used to promote or support unlawful 
activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1) (emphasis added). A “money transmitting” to include 
“transferring funds on behalf of the public by any and all means including but not limited 
to transfers within this country or to locations abroad by wire, check, draft, facsimile, or 
courier . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2). 
129 “By express action, the Florida Legislature has directly tied federal money laundering 
and [unlawful money services business] violations to the code. For example, [pursuant to 
Fla. Stat. § 560.111(1)(d)], it is a violation . . . to engage in an act that violates the Federal 
Anti–Money Laundering Statute [and the Federal Money Services Business Statute] . . . ,” 
See Israel Reyes, Florida’s Anti–Money Laundering Statutes, FLA. B.J., July/Aug. 1999, at 
66, 67. 
130 See Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 545–46. 
131 See id. 
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such money].”132 Moreover, Congress intended the Federal Money 
Services Business Statute to modernize the law governing money 
laundering and to safeguard from any evolving threats, which is made 
obvious by the statute’s broad language which makes it applicable to any 
business involved in transferring “funds . . . by any and all means.”133 
The Espinoza court dismissed the unlawful money services business 
charge against Espinoza after it concluded that Bitcoin could not fall under 
the statutory definition of “payment instrument” because virtual or digital 
currency is not specifically included in the definition, nor does Bitcoin fall 
under one of the categories defined within the “payment instrument.”134 
While acknowledging that Bitcoin did share some qualities in common 
with what people generally refer to as money, the Espinoza court 
concluded that “Bitcoin has a long way to go before it is the equivalent of 
money.”135 The Espinoza court reasoned that while Bitcoin could be 
exchanged for items of value, (1) Bitcoin is not a commonly used means 
of exchange because it is accepted by some, but not all, merchants or 
service providers, (2) the value of Bitcoin fluctuates wildly due to the 
uncertainty of Bitcoin’s future value and lack of stabilization, and (3) 
Bitcoin has a limited ability to act as a store of value.136 Furthermore, 
Judge Pooler reasoned that Bitcoin differed from “money” in that sense 
that it was a decentralized system, thereby not backed by anything, and did 
not have tangible wealth like cash or gold.137 Therefore, Judge Pooler 
concluded that Espinoza’s sale of Bitcoin did not constitute the operation 
of a money services business and dismissed the count.138 While these 
characteristics of Bitcoin may be of some consideration when determining 
the differences between Bitcoin and traditional government–supported 
currencies, they are not determinative characteristics of “money” or 
“monetary value.” “Monetary value” is defined within the Florida 
Business Services Statute as “a medium of exchange, whether or not 
redeemable in currency.”139 Contrary to the analysis conducted by the 
Espinoza court, the Florida Business Services Statute does not require, nor 
even contemplate, that an item of monetary value be commonly accepted 
                                                                                                             
132 United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 707–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
133 See Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 546; see also Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 708 (stating 
that the Court must give effect to the broad language Congress employed – namely that 18 
U.S.C. § 1960 “applies to any business involved in transferring ‘funds by any and all 
means’”). 
134 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016). 
135 Id. at 6. 
136 See id. at 5–6. 
137 See id. at 6. 
138 See id. 
139 FLA. STAT. § 560.103(21) (2016). 
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by merchants or service providers, stable, or centralized. Therefore, in 
order for bitcoins to fall under the express statutory definition of 
“monetary value,” and therefore within the scope of “payment 
instruments,” it must be determined that bitcoins are “medium of 
exchange, whether or not redeemable in currency.”140 
In United States v. Murgio,141 United States District Court Judge for 
the Southern District of New York, Alison J. Nathan, directly addressed 
the flawed “monetary value” analysis of the Espinoza court and concluded, 
contrary to the Espinoza court, that bitcoins are “monetary value” pursuant 
to the Florida Business Services Statute.142 The Murgio court addressed 
the Espinoza decision because Murgio was being indicted pursuant to the 
Federal Money Services Business Statute, which required an analysis of 
the Florida Business Services Statute in order to determine if Murgio’s 
business operation was indeed “unlicensed.”143 The Murgio court reasoned 
that “[b]itcoins can be accepted as ‘payment for goods and services’ or 
bought ‘directly from an exchange with a bank account.’”144 Additionally, 
the Murgio court concluded that bitcoins function as pecuniary resources 
and that Bitcoin is “used as a medium of exchange and a means of 
payment.”145 Because Bitcoin “can be easily purchased in exchange for 
ordinary currency, act as a denominator of value, and [is] used to conduct 
financial transactions,”146 the Murgio court concludes that Bitcoin falls 
                                                                                                             
140 See id. 
141 See United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Anthony 
Murgio and his co–defendants were charged with a nine–count indictment, including the 
operation of an unlicensed money transmitting business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960. 
It was alleged that Murgio and his co–defendants operated an unlawful Bitcoin exchange 
website called “Coin.mx” and bribed the chairman of the board of a federal credit union, 
Trevon Gross, to obscure the illegal nature of the website. The Murgio court held that 
bitcoins are “funds” within the plain meaning of the term and, therefore, fall within the 
statutory definition of “funds” under the Federal Money Services Business Statute. 
142 See id. at 712–16. District Judge Nathan reasoned that, although the Federal Money 
Services Business Statute does not define what qualifies as “money” other than to state that 
it includes “funds,” funds are intended to mean “pecuniary resources, which are generally 
accepted as a medium of exchange or means of payment.” This is because Bitcoin “can be 
easily purchased in exchange for ordinary currency, act as a denominator of value, and [is] 
used to conduct financial transaction.” 
143 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A) (2006). See also Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 712–14. The 
Federal Money Services Business Statute determines if a money transmitting business is 
unlicensed by considering whether the business operates “without an appropriate money 
transmitting license in a State where such operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or a 
felony.” § 1960(b)(1)(A). 
144 Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 707 (citing Getting started with Bitcoin, BITCOIN, 
https://bitcoin.org/en/getting-started (last visited Sept. 16, 2016)). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. (quoting United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). 
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within the Florida Business Services Statute’s express definition of 
“monetary value.”147 
It was Improper to Rely on IRS Notice 2014–21 
Incorrectly concluding that Espinoza did not qualify as a “payment 
instrument seller” because Bitcoin did not fall under the statutory 
definition of “payment instrument,” the Espinoza court improperly cited 
and relied on Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) Notice 2014–21.148 
Notice 2014–21 declared that “[t]he federal government . . . has decided 
to treat virtual currency as property for tax purposes.”149 Notice 2014–21, 
however, does not address the question of whether bitcoins constitute 
“payment instruments” pursuant to the Florida Business Services Statute 
and is irrelevant to the analysis.150 It seems logical to conclude that the 
Espinoza court erred when it sought guidance from a federal government 
regulatory agency and found its directives to be persuasive, but failed to 
find persuasive, or at least consider with proper regard, the abundant 
federal case law conducting a parallel analysis on the Florida Business 
Services Statute’s model statutes. 
                                                                                                             
147 Id. at 712 (citing FLA. STAT. § 560.103(21) (2016). See also id. at 713 (“[Because] 
the Espinoza court is the first Florida court to have considered the reach of Chapter 560 
[the Florida Business Services Statute] in the context of Bitcoin, and neither the state’s 
Supreme Court nor the District Courts of Appeal have weighed in[,] [t]his Court is . . . not 
bound by the decision in Espinoza, though it owes the decision ‘proper regard.’”). 
148 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016) (citing 
§ 560.103(29)); see United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 713 (S.D.N.Y 2016) 
(“[W]ith respect to the meaning of ‘payment instrument,’ the only reason the Espinoza 
court cites for concluding that bitcoins are not ‘payment instruments’ is that the IRS ‘has 
decided to treat virtual currency as property for federal tax purposes.’”). 
149 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016); I.R.S. Notice 2014–
21, 2014–16 I.R.B. 938. 
150 United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[T]he IRS 
Notice . . . makes clear that it ‘addresses only U.S. federal tax consequences of transactions 
in, or transactions that use, convertible virtual currency.’”) (quoting I.R.S. Notice 2014–
21, 2014–16 I.R.B. 938). See also United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 569 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (addressing Ulbricht’s argument that bitcoins cannot form the basis for a 
money laundering conspiracy, the Ulbricht court rejected the application of Notice 2014–
21 because “neither the IRS nor FinCEN has addressed the question of whether a “financial 
transaction” can occur with Bitcoins”). See also United States v. Budovsky, No. 12cr368 
(DLC), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127717, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2015). Pursuant to the 
Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statute, the Budovsky court rejected the argument that 
virtual currency is not “funds” in light of Notice 2014–21 because “[t]hese documents are 
inapposite and do not suggest that the term ‘funds’ should not be read to encompass virtual 
currencies.” Id. at *36 (citing I.R.S. Notice 2014–21, 2014–16 I.R.B. 938; Ulbricht, 31 F. 
Supp. 3d at 569). 
2017] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 219 
 
The Murgio court specifically rejected the Espinoza court’s reference 
to Notice 2014–21 when deciding that bitcoins are not “payment 
instruments” for two reasons. First, an argument that bitcoins fail to fall 
under the statutory definition of “payment instruments” based on Notice 
2014–21 “ignores the fact that [the Florida Business Services Statute] 
defines ‘payment instrument’ as including ‘monetary value.’”151 Second, 
the Espinoza court failed to acknowledge that “[t]he IRS’s classification 
is divorced from the basic statutory interpretation question at issue . . . .”152 
Therefore, like how the Murgio court remained persuaded that the Florida 
Business Services Statute applied to persons and businesses that 
conducted transactions using Bitcoin,153 this paper fails to identify or 
acknowledge the relevance of Notice 2014–21 in addressing the question 
of whether Bitcoin constitutes a “payment instrument.” 
Espinoza Qualifies as a “Payment Instrument Seller” 
Following the statutory structure of the Florida Business Services 
Statute, because bitcoins constitute “monetary value” and “payment 
instrument” is defined, among other categories, as “payment of money or 
monetary value whether or not negotiable,” Bitcoin qualifies as a 
“payment instrument.”154 Furthermore, because the Florida Business 
Services Statute defines “money services business” to include “a person 
who acts as a payment instrument seller”155 and a “payment instrument 
seller” is something “qualified to do business in this state which sells a 
payment instrument,”156 Espinoza must be considered a “payment 
instrument seller” and, therefore, a person who unlawfully engaged in the 
business of a “money services business.”157 
The hesitation of the Espinoza court to prosecute Espinoza’s 
transactions involving Bitcoin may be partly because of a lack of 
precedent. However, it is established under Florida law that statutes may 
“apply to new situations, cases, conditions, things, subjects, [or] 
methods . . . coming into existence subsequent to its enactment; [provided 
h]owever, [these new aspects] must be in the same general class as those 
                                                                                                             
151 Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Order Granting Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 4–5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
dismissed July 22, 2016)). 
152 Id. at 713–14. 
153 See id. at 714. 
154 FLA. STAT. § 560.103(29) (2016). Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 712 (“Because bitcoins 
are ‘monetary value,’ they are also ‘payment instruments.’”). 
155 § 560.103(22) (emphasis added). 
156 § 560.103(30). 
157 § 560.103(29). 
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treated in the statute.”158 That is, such new situations, cases, conditions, 
and the like must reasonably be “within the general purview, scope, 
purpose, and policy of the statute.”159 In light of the Florida Business 
Services Statute’s text and purpose, it seems clear that bitcoins fall within 
the purview and scope of the Florida Business Services Statute because 
bitcoins qualify as payment instruments. Additionally, it is also well–
established that “motion to dismiss charges against a defendant should 
rarely be granted, and granted only when the facts and inferences arising 
there from, taken in the light most favorable to the State, do not establish 
a prima facie case.”160 Under this standard, the Espinoza court should not 
have granted Espinoza’s pre–trial motion to dismiss even if it remained 
uncertain about whether bitcoins constituted “monetary value” and, 
therefore, “payment instruments.” 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Espinoza court incorrectly dismissed all three counts pursuant to 
the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute and Florida Business Services 
Statute because of flawed analyses of both statutes. Although the Espinoza 
court correctly concluded that bitcoins do not qualify as “monetary 
instruments” pursuant to the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute, the 
Espinoza court conducted a flawed analysis by using its reasoning of 
“payment instrument” pursuant to the Florida Business Services Statute as 
a surrogate for the statutory definition of “monetary instruments” and 
completely ignored the first prong of the statutory definition of “financial 
transaction,” which included the term “funds.”161 If the Espinoza court had 
not overlooked the term “funds” within the definition of “financial 
transaction” of the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute, it likely 
would have reached the conclusion that Espinoza’s Bitcoin transactions 
qualified as “financial transactions” based on the same analyses that 
multiple federal courts have conducted. Furthermore, the Espinoza court’s 
application of the doctrinal rule of lenity and void–for–vagueness is 
improper because there is no ambiguity as to the Florida Anti–Money 
Laundering Statute’s language or its statutory definitions. 
                                                                                                             
158 48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 125 (2004) (“When a statute is expressed in general terms 
and in words of the present tense, it is generally construable to apply not only to things and 
conditions existing at the time of its passage, but also will be given a prospective effect and 
made to apply to such as come into existence thereafter.”). 
159 Id. 
160 State v. Gensler, 929 So. 2d 27, 29 (3d Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations 
omitted). 
161 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 6–7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016). 
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Additionally, the Espinoza court improperly concluded that bitcoins 
did not qualify as “monetary value” because the court failed to 
acknowledge that, pursuant to the Florida Business Services Statute, 
“monetary value” is “a medium of exchange, whether or not redeemable 
in currency.”162 Rather than analyzing whether Bitcoin is a medium of 
exchange, the Espinoza court reasoned that Bitcoin is not a commonly 
used means of exchange, the value of Bitcoin fluctuates wildly, and 
Bitcoin has a limited ability to act as a store of value.163 This ignores the 
fact that Bitcoin, although possibly an uncommon and volatile medium of 
exchange, remains a medium of exchange. If the Espinoza court had 
concluded that Bitcoin is a medium of exchange, Bitcoin would clearly 
qualify as a “payment instrument” pursuant to the Florida Business 
Services Statute and Espinoza would constitute a “payment instrument 
seller.” Therefore, Espinoza’s Bitcoin transactions to Arias must fall 
within the purview of the Florida Business Services Statute and a 
preliminary dismissal of such charges by the Espinoza court was 
unwarranted. 
The Third District Court of Appeal should reverse and remand the 
decision of the Espinoza court to be consistent with the well–established 
rules of statutory interpretation. Such rules of statutory interpretation 
demand both an appropriate plain meaning analysis divorced from the 
influence of the irrelevant IRS Notice 2014–21 as well as an analysis of 
the legislative intent in enacting the relevant statutes. 
Public Policy Importance 
The Espinoza court’s decision to dismiss the Florida Anti–Money 
Laundering Statute and the Florida Business Services Statute charges 
creates a precedent in Florida that leaves a gaping hole in the state’s ability 
to regulate and prosecute illicit acts involving cryptocurrencies. Florida’s 
inability to regulate or prosecute acts that would ordinarily constitute 
money laundering, but now fall outside the purviews of both the Florida 
Anti–Money Laundering Statute and the Florida Business Services Statute 
because cryptocurrencies are utilized, opens the door for tech–savvy 
criminals. Such precedence cannot be allowed to stand and must be 
overturned by the Third District Court of Appeal or addressed by the 
Florida legislature. 
                                                                                                             
162 FLA. STAT. § 560.103(17) (2016). 
163 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 5–6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016). 
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Domestic Legislative and Judicial Action 
In Espinoza, Judge Pooler calls for legislative action to clarify the 
statutory language of the applicable Florida statutes.164 Although no 
legislative measures have yet been taken within Florida to directly address 
cryptocurrencies pursuant to the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute 
and the Florida Business Services Statute, two members of the United 
States Congress have established the new Congressional Blockchain 
Caucus, which “will study Bitcoin and Blockchain technology.”165 
Congressmen Jared Polis and Mick Mulvaney organized the 
Congressional Blockchain Caucus “to educate lawmakers on Capitol Hill 
about cryptocurrency . . . and the [legal] issues surrounding it.”166 
However, any legislation that may result from the efforts of the 
Congressional Blockchain Caucus will not be binding on the Florida state 
courts when they analyze issues pursuant to the Florida Anti–Money 
Laundering Statute and the Florida Business Services Statute. 
As mentioned, Espinoza has been appealed to Florida’s Third District 
Court of Appeal. Although this appeal will likely provide greater clarity 
in regards the applicability of money laundering statutes to actions 
involving cryptocurrency, the Supreme Court of Florida will not have an 
opportunity to speak to the issue until another District Court of Appeal 
renders a decision that directly conflicts with the Third District Court of 
Appeal decision after the decision is rendered.167 
Bitcoin in Foreign Policies 
The United States and Florida are not the only governing bodies that 
are grappling with the new legal challenges that cryptocurrencies are 
presenting. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that Bitcoin 
exchange transactions should be exempt from applicable value–added 
                                                                                                             
164 See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016) (“Without legislative 
action geared towards a much[–]needed update to the particular language within [these] 
statute[s], this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence as a matter of law . . . .”). 




167 See Supreme Court of Florida, FLORIDA COURTS, http://www.flcourts.org/florida-
courts/supreme-court.stml (last visited Aug. 27, 2017).The Supreme Court of Florida has 
mandatory jurisdiction and, therefore, must review (1) final orders imposing death 
sentences, (2) district court decisions declaring a Florida statute unconstitutional, (3) bond 
validations, and (4) select orders of the Public Service Commission involving utility rates 
and services. However, the Supreme Court of Florida has limited discretionary jurisdiction 
and, therefore, may grant and review various petitions that would result in the case being 
decided on the merits. 
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taxes.168 This ECJ decision treats Bitcoin similarly to currency, bank notes 
and coins used as legal tender.169 The ECJ made this decision only about 
one month after the United States Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) reached a contradictory conclusion, which deemed 
Bitcoin to be a commodity.170 Importantly, the ECJ’s decision “squarely 
places [B]itcoin and similar digital currencies within the ambit of 
‘financial transactions’ [under certain European Union Directives].”171 
Countries around the world, however, have also expressed negative 
views of digital currencies and implemented bans of varying degrees.172 
Most notably, countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia, and Bangladesh have 
implemented total bans on the use of Bitcoin, while countries like China, 
Sweden, India, and Russia have quasi–bans on the cryptocurrency.173 
Canada and Australia are still deliberating on how to treat Bitcoin 
legally.174 
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